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Abstract
This article explores how some potential migrants in the Horn of Africa incorporate the prospects of extreme danger into
their journeys. It draws on evidence from qualitative interviews and focus group discussions with over 400 respondents,
mainly from Ethiopian and Somali communities. It shows that the risks of migration within the Horn of Africa are often
well known, thanks to strong migrant networks and improved mobile communications. Indeed, migrants may be better
informed of the risks of the journey than they are about their prospects of securing a good living upon arrival. However,
rather than discouraging people’s migration, high risk may open up new possibilities. This article supports this argument
with two examples. First, as Yemen descended into civil war, the breakdown of state control created new opportunities to
move undetected, notwithstanding the threat of injury and death. This helps explain why the number of Ethiopians pass-
ing through Yemen increased with the conflict, contrary to expectations. Second, some young Somalis are soliciting the
services of smugglers to help them move towards Europe, knowing that they are likely to be abused and held for ransom
en route. They gamble on their captors’ demands being met by family members, who would not otherwise have endorsed
or paid for their journey. These findings challenge common assumptions about risk and decision-making, and suggests
that some migrants may move because of, rather than in spite of, the risks involved. It also calls into question initiatives
that seek to deter migration by raising awareness about the risks of the journey.
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1. Introduction
Migration is an inherently risky process with varying
probability of a negative outcome. With this high level
of uncertainty, it is impossible to know what lies ahead.
The dangers are exacerbated for migrants moving in the
context of extreme poverty, insecurity and the absence
of rule of law. Risk is generally seen as something to be
minimised. Potential migrants need to know about the
perils of their journey so they canmake an informed deci-
sion. Many observers assume that if the risks are too
great, the rational choice will be not to move. However,
people continue to use the most dangerous routes. This
apparently irrational behaviour tends to be explained by
two concerns: first, their lack of information about the
dangers; second, their assessment of the huge poten-
tial gains from migration that outweigh the risks. In this
article, we draw on empirical evidence from Puntland
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(Somalia), Djibouti and Yemen to suggest two alternative
angles to the issue of risk in migration.
First, this article depicts a clear distinction between
migrants and external actors when it comes to their per-
ceptions and evaluations of risk. They are coming from
different decision spaces, almost parallel worlds, where
there may be occasional points of contact but no way to
move from one to the other. This raises questions about
what is at risk, and whose version of risk we are taking
into account. Second, there is a new twist, where the
extreme risk of the journey is used by migrants as a crit-
ical element in their migration strategy. In the case of
young Somalis seeking routes into Europe, without the
risk of kidnapping and death on the way, they would
not be able to move. In the case of Ethiopians transiting
through Yemen, widespread insecurity generated by the
five-year civil war gives thema greater chance of crossing
borders undetected. Both groups are acting rationally to
achieve their ends—to reach their destination—but the
risk they are concerned about is as much that of failing,
as that of being injured (physically or mentally) or killed
on the way. From this perspective, these dangers may
improve their prospects of success.
This article starts by considering the different ways
in which risk is conceptualised within the migration lit-
erature. This is followed by an overview of migration
patterns between the Horn of Africa and Yemen, and
beyond, to theGulf and Europe. Having set the scene, the
article goes on to consider the ways in which migrants
weigh up risks, suggesting that they are not only aware,
but also accepting of the abuse and exploitation they are
likely to endure en route to their destination. What is
more, while migrants have to tolerate unavoidable risk
in this way, in some cases, the extreme dangers open
up newopportunities thatmay facilitate theirmovement
and itmay evenplay a critical role in their decisions about
how and where to migrate. In light of these findings, the
article raises questions about contemporary migration
policies, in particular perceptions around smugglers and
the effectiveness of campaigns that provide information
about the risks and dangers of migration.
2. Risk in Migration Studies
The idea of risk is embedded in different ways within
manymigration theories. In cost-benefit analysis, the val-
ue of factors is discounted depending on the level of
risk involved—the benefit of the movement to the city is
reduced according to the probability of remaining unem-
ployed or failing to reach the desired level of income
(De Jong & Fawcett, 1981; Harris & Todaro, 1970). Here,
we are concerned with risk that is incurred as a conse-
quence of migration and it moderates the associated cal-
culation of losses and gains.
The new economics of labour migration takes amuch
broader view, seeing risk as a fundamental aspect of the
lives of poor people. Rather than considering risk as a by-
product of moving, new economics of labour migration
puts it at the centre of a household’s decision-making
aboutmigration. It analyses themovement of an individu-
al as part of a household’s strategy to diversify its sources
of income and thereby spread risk and improve the
household’s livelihood security (Stark & Levhari, 1982;
Wouterse & Taylor, 2008). Looking beyond the house-
hold, research into networks and transnational connec-
tions draws attention to how these wider social struc-
tures can help defuse the costs and risks of migration in
destination areas by providing assistance to migrants on
first arrival, smoothing access to jobs and housing, and so
on (Hugo, 1981; Massey, 1990; Portes, 1995).
The literature discussed so far has focused on the
risk associatedwith the outcomes ofmigration on arrival.
Can I secure a job and the income needed tomakemigra-
tion worthwhile? However, there is also a body of liter-
ature on the risk associated with the journey. There are
twobroad strands of analysis here. First, there is research
into different migrants’ assessment of the risk and their
attitude to it. Research into the (non-Jewish) migration
from Ecuador to Israel challenges the importance of
the household strategy in shaping migrants’ decision-
making. Instead, there is evidence of a more individual-
ist approach to migration and risk from a “new type of
migrant” who operates autonomously from family and
community, has little established connection to their des-
tination, and makes the decision to migrate hastily and
with little information (Kalir, 2005). While thesemigrants
take on the risk of travelling alone, many still connect
with transnational networks once they reach Israel.
A second strand of analysis focuses on the nature of
the risks faced by migrants on the journey and strategies
to mitigate them. This is often framed in terms of protec-
tion risks—the likelihood of people’s basic human rights
being violated, even to the extent of losing lives (Spagna,
2017). These risks are exacerbated when it comes to
irregular migration—or more specifically irregular bor-
der crossing. This often involves dangerous routes, espe-
cially those involving smugglers, and the risks of vio-
lence and exploitation are real and well-documented
(Busza, Teferra, Omer, & Zimmerman, 2017; Davy, 2017).
Migrants may start their journey bymaking a contractual
agreement with a smuggler to help them cross borders
illicitly. All too often, they end up in the hands of traffick-
ers, who cheat, abuse and exploit them to extract maxi-
mum profit from the migrants, their families and friends.
While both smugglers and traffickers work illegally, and
there are often fuzzy boundaries between them, the crit-
ical difference is that the former act with the consent
of the migrants (clients), while the latter coerces them
(victims; Ati, 2017, pp. 7–10).
While recognising this dangerous slippage between
smuggling and trafficking, there is an alternative narra-
tive that is built on notions of solidarity and reciprocity,
and which recognises the potential social and collec-
tive role that smuggling can play in facilitating mobility
(Achilli, 2018). This more nuanced narrative has arguably
gained momentum in light of the externalisation of EU
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migration policy. Indeed, Ayalew (2018) even suggests
that, in the context of a restrictive migration regime
that criminalises movement, smuggling can be seen as
a “system of refugee protection from below” when safe
or legitimate means of mobility are increasingly erod-
ed. Seen from this perspective, it is the state-sponsored
efforts to manage migration and prevent migrants from
reaching Europe that have created the obstacles tomove-
ments that oblige migrants to take more dangerous
and risky itineraries—rather than smugglers themselves
(Rodriguez, 2019).
It is often assumed that people only take extreme
routes when they do not know the full scale of the
perilous position in which they are putting themselves.
Once informed of the risk—that they may be kidnapped,
raped, enslaved, maimed or killed on the way—the ratio-
nal behaviour is not to migrate in this way. However, a
growing number of studies critique this focus on ratio-
nal behaviour by showing that the significant risks of the
journey are well known to migrants, but that this does
not deter them from making the journey. In the case
of Malian migrants, Dougnon and Gagliardi (2013) argue
that migration is not just a rational economic deduc-
tion of access to property or earnings—it has deep and
powerful cultural ramifications around the realisation of
youthful dreams, social aspiration and a rite of passage.
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) also adopt a social con-
structionist approach that sees risk as determined by cul-
ture and open to different social interpretations.
Other studies of risk and migration adopt a gam-
bling analogy, whereby the decision to move is akin to
a bet, the outcome of which is seen in terms of luck
and the successful conclusion of the journey as “win-
ning the jackpot” (Belloni, 2016). Just as people play the
lottery even though the chances of winning are almost
zero, the chance—albeit small—of successfully arriving
at their destination urges migrants to take the gamble
and try their luck, even against high odds of danger and
risk (Belloni, 2019).
These approaches can shed light on the failures of
sensitisation campaigns that seek to deter migration by
spelling out the risks and dangers. If only migrants—
or their families as the primary decision-making body—
knew about the dangers, they would act differently.
The policy response is to focus on the flow of information
to potential migrants and their families. Instead of recog-
nising the cultural embeddedness of migration and alter-
native local conceptualisations of risk, they categorise
those who embark on irregular journeys as reckless or
irresponsible—a position vested with moral overtones
that has been used to justify repressive measures to
stop their journey and criminalise those who help them
(Gerver, 2019).
3. Background to the Study
Before presenting our findings in more detail, this sec-
tion gives a brief overview of the background and the
methods used for the study, which was undertaken
by the Research and Evidence Facility (REF) in 2017.
The REF is a research consortium led by SOAS University
of London with the University of Manchester and Sahan,
a Nairobi-based thinktank in Kenya. It is funded by the EU
Emergency Trust Fund for Africa to conduct independent
academic research into the drivers of instability, migra-
tion, and displacement in the greater Horn of Africa (for
more details see theResearch&Evidence Facilitywebsite
at https://blogs.soas.ac.uk/ref-hornresearch).
The project set out to explore what is driving the
growth in migration from the Horn of Africa to Yemen in
spite of the risks and dangers. It also assessed the extent
towhich smuggling and trafficking networks are involved
in facilitating these movements, as well as the impact of
thesemovements on the lives of migrants, the local com-
munities and wider society. The full report (Sturridge,
Bakewell, & Hammond, 2017) offers more details of the
methods and findings of the study.
The research adopted a comparative approach, look-
ing at migration through the two main routes from
Puntland (Somalia) and Djibouti towards Yemen. Teams
of local researchers were established in key research
sites to identify informants and conduct semi-structured
interviews and focus group discussions. In Puntland,
the research team focused their work on Bossaso,
Qardo and Garowe. In Djibouti, the focus was Djibouti
town and Obock. In Yemen, the teams were located in
Sana’a, Aden, and Al Hodeidah. Over a six-month peri-
od between January and June 2017, the research team
consulted over 400 respondents in these locations—
including migrants, community representatives, people
involved in smuggling, government officials, the UN,
NGOs and donors. It is hoped that the dataset will be
deposited in an archive to made available for further
research, subject to ensuring that sufficient contextual
information can be removed from transcripts to make
them fully anonymous.
In order to ensure comparability of findings, a set
of common research questions was drafted by the REF
and refined in consultation with the research teams to
ensure that the questions were appropriate for each spe-
cific research site. Following the data collection, the qual-
itative data set was coded and analysed along themes
initially guided by the original research questions. Each
country research team was also responsible for writing
a field report that provided a first analysis of their find-
ings. This fed into the overall project report. While the
interview guidelines asked respondents what they knew
about the risks faced by migrants crossing to Yemen, risk
was not a central theme at the outset of the original study.
However, through the analysis of the data from the mul-
tiple sources, it emerged as a critical factor, sometimes
shaping people’smovements in counter-intuitiveways, to
the extent of opening up newopportunities tomove. This
article focuses on these new insights into the attitudes
of Ethiopian and Somali migrants to risk and the role it
played inmaking possible their journeys towards the Gulf
Social Inclusion, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 1, Pages 186–195 188
and Europe.We have a limited aim of demonstrating that
risk does play this strategic role in shaping movement for
some, rather than making any claim that this is the case
for all. With this in mind, we are drawing on anonymised
quotations froma range of respondents that illustrate the
points (note, all names used are pseudonyms).
4. Migration between the Horn of Africa and Yemen
There is a long history of migration back and forth
between the Horn of Africa and Yemen (de Regt, 2014;
Thiollet, 2014). The majority of crossings towards Yemen
have comprised Ethiopians, Somalis, and Eritreans.
For the most part, Ethiopians are moving with the aim of
travelling onwards to find work in Saudi Arabia (RMMS,
2016). Many of them are from the Oromo region of
Ethiopia, where they have faced political and econom-
ic repression including exclusion from employment and
seizure of land. Themajority are young, singlemen, often
with limited levels of education, but there is a sizeable
and growing number of femalemigrants attracted by the
considerable demand for domestic workers in the Gulf
states (Fernandez, 2020; Zewdu, 2017). Key informants
from multiple agencies including the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees and the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) suggested they could
make up 20 to 30 percent of the Ethiopianmigrants cross-
ing to Yemen. Indeed, sources in Djibouti suggest that
women make up a large percentage of those crossing
the border, but they are not seen at the points where
people seek assistance and are insteadmoved in vehicles
between smugglers’ houses and during the journey car-
ry out domestic work in private homes, which limits their
visibility in public spaces.
Over the years, the movement of many Somalis to
Yemen has been driven by the need to escape conflict
and insecurity and there has long been a Somali refugee
population staying in Yemen. Government and NGO key
informants observed that, more recently, there has been
a growing number of Somalis crossing to Yemen with
the aim of reaching Europe, travelling on a convoluted
and extremely dangerous route via Yemen back across
the Red Sea to Sudan and then through Libya. Their
background is more mixed than the Ethiopian migrants,
ranging from uneducated people from very poor back-
grounds to those with tertiary levels of education and
coming from rather wealthy families. There has been
less research into which migrants are using this relative-
ly recent route so there is limited knowledge about the
numbers or gender distribution (respondents suggested
that this route is mostly used by men, but the research
team were able to interview almost equal numbers of
Somali men and women who were embarking on the
crossing to Yemen).
Wherever their origin in the Horn of Africa, few
migrants aim to stay in Yemen. Some move relatively
quickly on to the next stage of their journey. Others
stay on in Yemen for a number of weeks, months and
even years, while they work to save up for their next
move or recover from illness or destitution. There has
also been movement in the opposite direction, most
notably among Yemeni refugees fleeing the war that
has engulfed their homeland (Mohamud, 2016). Most
migration over these routes is undertaken irregularly and
under the control of smugglers. African states, support-
ed by donors (including the EU) and international organ-
isations (in particular IOM), have responded to these
irregular movements by enforcing new regulations, bor-
der controls, cross-border agreements and information
campaigns directed towards potential migrants. Saudi
Arabia has also been extremely active in deporting irreg-
ular migrants from Ethiopia (Fernandez, 2020, p. 30).
However, the smuggling and trafficking networks that
facilitate these movements have remained resilient and
(according to respondents) even increased since 2015,
and the numbers of migrants remain high.
With the escalation of the conflict and humanitarian
crisis in Yemen in 2015 and 2016, it would have been rea-
sonable to expect a marked fall in the number of people
heading to Yemen across the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
Instead, however, the numbers continued to increase
to their highest recorded levels (Botti & Phillips, 2019;
Frouws, 2016). While there could be little doubt that
the drivers of out-migration in Ethiopia and Somalia—
political oppression, insecurity, widespread poverty and
drought—continued unabated, it was unclear how the
complex array of factors intersected to shape the dynam-
ics of migration between the Horn of African and Yemen.
Indeed, the overall picture driving migration was more
about the underlying chronic conditions that make it
impossible for people to see a desirable future where
they are living than with particular or isolated crises. For
example, when it came to explaining why they wanted
to leave, young Somalis talked first of having no future
in Somalia—especially when they had completed what
education they could and saw no prospects of getting a
job or income that would give them the lifestyle to which
they aspired. The immediate crises of drought and inse-
curity were less prominent as rationales for movement.
Only one migrant respondent made explicit reference to
the drought in spite of the fact that drought in Somalia
during 2016 and 2017 affected over 1.7 million people
(OCHA, 2017). Such crisesmay exacerbate people’s sense
of frustration and make them more inclined to start on
their journey, but they are rarely the primary reason.
5. Weighing Up the Risks
Migration between the Horn of Africa and Yemen has
long been characterised by danger and risk. Migrants
described being increasingly coerced into using smug-
glers’ services, or risk facing detention. They endured
deplorable conditions during the journey and upon
arrival at their intended destination, suffering from
abuse and hardship, illness and death. In addition to
frequent reports of abuse, many migrants lack food and
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water, basic services, shelter and livelihoods; difficulties
that are compounded by generalised insecurity and an
inhospitable climate en route. These dangers are faced
by both men and women, but there were also more
gender-specific risks. Women were particularly vulner-
able to sexual violence, with many referring either to
their own or others horrific experiences of rape and oth-
er assaults. For men, moving across Yemen brought the
potential danger of being caught and conscripted into
military service with rebel forces.
Migrants that were interviewed generally knew that
the journeywas dangerous and involved high risks.Many
of the Ethiopian respondents had previous experience
as irregular migrants and had spent some time in Saudi
Arabiaworking; they spoke of knowing about the journey
already, including the risks it entails:
Because of my previous experience, I know, the
biggest risk emerges during sea-travelling; it’s a three-
day journeywith hunger and thirst. If thewavesmake
the boat hard to control, smugglers beat people and
offload them forcefully into the sea. (Salim, Ethiopian
man, age 25, Bossaso)
Less experienced migrants relied on information from
friends and relatives already abroad at their destination.
Their pre-departure knowledge was then supplemented
by information from other migrants, smugglers and com-
munities they meet along the way. Whatever the source,
the expectations were bleak:
I know all the risks, including loss of life, harass-
ment, detention, and so on. (Filan, Ethiopian woman,
age 24, Bossaso)
The smuggling group might demand more money
when I reach Libya; theymight tortureme; I could get
killed or the inflatable boat sinks; I know the trip is not
easy, but I want to do it. (Bashiir, Somali man, age 24,
Bossaso)
To me, it was a suicide mission, it was between death
and life, but I was ready for it, if lucky I would survive!
(Bifani, Ethiopian woman, age 24, Bossaso)
While awareness may encourage migrants to adjust or
reconsider which route they take, it is not enough to
deter them frommigrating in the first place or continuing
with their journey once started. Furthermore, migrants
are less likely to change their minds about migrating the
further they progress along their journey, as the invest-
ments and sacrifices increase, and they are reluctant
to return empty handed to family back home who may
have contributed their savings to make the journey pos-
sible. Instead, they take precautionary steps to minimise
the consequences of anticipated abuse and exploitation.
Some respondents described arranging for family mem-
bers to keep aside money to pay ransoms to smugglers,
while Ethiopian women have been known to take contra-
ceptives to prevent pregnancy if raped:
I knew that I might be arrested by smugglers who ask
for ransom, so I prepared my family for that to keep
some money aside in that case. (Heeran, Ethiopian
man, age 25, Sana’a)
These kinds of safety measures suggest that migrants
are not only aware, but also accepting of the abuse and
exploitation they are likely to endure. Nearly all Ethiopian
migrants described the journey as hard, long and very
uncomfortable. They spoke of hunger, thirst, illness and
physical danger, including a truck overturning and other
accidents on the road. Payments were demanded with
menaces, but this was discussed as part of an accept-
ed rough trade, comparable, perhaps, to the way loan
sharks exploit their customers’ inability to get their ser-
vice anywhere else, make threats to ensure compliance,
but still deliver the service in the end. Being beaten if
money is not paid seems to be accepted as a fact of life.
The risks of abuse and exploitation are seen as a nec-
essary part of the journey that migrants must tolerate in
order to reach one’s destination. Very few saw the risks
as outweighing the potential benefit of their journeys.
Half of the Ethiopianmigrants interviewed in Bossaso felt
they were already better off, and the journey was prov-
ing worthwhile, even in the face of the hardships. Others
were more circumspect, expressing some uncertainty
about the final outcome as they were still on the jour-
ney. Even among those who said things were worse, only
three suggested they would return home if they could.
The remarkable sense that things have worked out well
in the end despite all the difficulties is illustrated by the
responses of Abdi, an Ethiopian man (age 45). In the con-
versation below, he describes being held hostage with
his wife by smugglers who beat him with a metal stick
and threatened him with a knife until he agreed to pay
the rates they demanded:
Yes, they tortured us, held us hostage for two days
and asked our families for ransom money.
[Do you feel you have achieved your objective for
moving?] Yes, I ammore than happy, since I mademy
trip to here, now I feel safer.
[What has worked out well?] In an overall sense, all
has worked out well.
[What has worked out badly/less well?] Besides the
challenges of the trip, the only thing that happened
unplanned was the extra money charged.
6. Seeking Out the Risks
For the majority of migrants interviewed during this
research, the risk of abuse and exploitation isweighed up
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as a necessary means to a more important end—arrival
at one’s destination. However, while some migrants
tolerate unavoidable risk in this way, others seek out
risky environments—as the opportunities these present
for moving represent a decisive factor in their deci-
sions about how and where to migrate. This relation-
ship between risk and decision-making is highlighted by
Ethiopianmigrants transiting through Yemen, and, in the
most extreme form, by Somali migrants hoping to reach
Europe—cases that are now explored in more detail.
As noted above, the escalation of civil war in Yemen
has not reduced the number of migrants travelling there.
On the contrary, the breakdown of state institutions
in Yemen and subsequent lack of policy and control
has opened up opportunities for smugglers and traf-
fickers to operate more easily. According to one smug-
gler respondent:
Before the war in Yemen, our boats used to get
fired at by the Yemeni Maritime forces patrolling
their sea, but now after the war, we don’t encounter
any problems—but sometimes ships belonging to the
Saudi-led coalition can intercept these boats. (Somali
smuggler based in Bossaso)
Similar views were echoed by other key informants,
while migrants reported having to take the routes as
directed by the smuggler they had contracted. As the
situation changes rapidly, these migration routes are
adjusted in response to gaps in state control—or take
advantage of state actors’ fluctuating complicity with
smugglers and traffickers. How far these purported gaps
in control actually result in an easier journey formigrants,
especially for Ethiopians who aim to cross Yemen to
reach Saudi Arabia, is unclear. There is limited informa-
tion about what happens to migrants once they enter
Yemen (Frouws & Akumu, 2016). There seems little
doubt that Yemen has become a more dangerous and
unpredictable space: a number of Ethiopian respondents
were left severely injured after treading on landmines
while trying to cross the Yemeni-Saudi border in Sa’dah.
The chaos of war and collapse (or severe degra-
dation) of state systems in Yemen created a space of
irregularity—where state controls were absent or more
open to manipulation through bribery or other means,
and in which smugglers could operate with impuni-
ty. Similar spaces have been observed elsewhere, in
particular, in Libya, which has generated huge inter-
est as it was seen to open a direct route towards
the Mediterranean and Europe (Baldwin-Edwards &
Lutterbeck, 2019). However, this challenge to regular
migration is not confined to war zones. Spaces of irreg-
ularity can be found in many borderlands across the
developing world, where the concept of regularity may
be almost meaningless (Bakewell, 2020). To draw a line
between regular and irregular migration in such a zone
achieves little. Movement continues and there is no
means to make it regular—either because there is chaos,
as seen in Yemen, or because there is no infrastructure
to enable regular movement. If people cannot realistical-
ly pass via a border post or nobody has the papers or
means to obtain papers to document their movement,
how can any crossing be (or become) regular?
For the young Somalis setting off from Bossaso in the
hope of reaching Europe, the calculus of risk was very dif-
ferent. They faced similar challenges in navigating spaces
of irregularity as the Ethiopians. However, for them, the
obstacle to their dreams was not just the state, but also
their parents, who did not support their leaving and
would not willingly offer them any help for their journey
to Europe (for which they cited costs of US$8–10,000):
[Do you know about anyone else taking actions to
control movement—If so who? What do they do?]
The only people we fear intercepting us from going
is the parents. Once they become suspicious, they
immediately communicate with checkpoints over all
the possible routes. They also physically visit smug-
glers hideouts and camps. Parents also use secret
intelligence agents for spying. (Zeinab, Somali wom-
an, age 22, Bossaso)
These young migrants had heard the horrific stories of
those held to ransom in the desert by traffickers. When
asked what she knew about the risks she might face on
the journey, a young female respondent listed “torture,
rape, killing and extortion.” But they see this as a lever to
use against their families who did not want them to leave
and would not, under normal circumstances, pay for
their journey. Many of the Somalis interviewed intend-
ed to take up the ‘leave now, pay later’ scheme increas-
ingly adopted by smugglers to entice would-be migrants,
and were not planning to tell their families of their inten-
tion to leave. However, they calculated that their rela-
tives would feel compelled to pay the costs of the jour-
ney on their behalf, for fear that they would otherwise
be subjected to torture and abuse if they did not. If it
were simply a question of running out ofmoney, the fam-
ily may demand that the son or daughter returns home.
However, once the youths have committed themselves
to the smugglers, the family is trapped into paying for an
onward journey, they do not condone and, under normal
circumstances, would never have funded. In these cases,
it is the risk that makes the journey feasible:
We negotiated the price until we agreed to
$8,000….I didn’t pay them; my family has to pay for
them when I reach Libya….I didn’t tell my family, but
they will pay it when they know I am in Libya in the
hands of the smuggling group. (Warsame, Somali
man, age 22, Bossaso)
It generally costs a maximum of $10,000 to reach
Europe….But look, I shouldn’t worry about that, they
[smugglers] are ready to sponsor us till Yemen. From
there, then it’s up to parents who are forced to pay
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whatever it’s going to cost them to rescue me, and
they will not force me to come back from that dis-
tance. They would rather support me to proceed
since I am almost close to the finishing line. (Amaal,
Somali woman, age 22, Bossaso)
The remarks made by our respondents suggest some-
thing of an inter-generational tussle. Children are pre-
pared to defy their parents and effectively blackmail
them to pay for their departure. How this plays out in
later life, it is hard to imagine. There is both the huge
risk of being hurt, or killed, by trafficking gangs and
then that of alienating one’s family. The relatives may
bail the young people out, but is there a price to be
extracted later? Many have reported on the huge efforts
many poor African migrants make to send money home
from Europe—and the challenges it creates for them
in establishing a livelihood there (Lindley, 2010). This is
cast in a different light if one looks at the way some
young migrants have arranged their journeys at huge,
unplanned and unwanted cost to their families.
7. Incorporating Risk into Migration Policy
These findings present two challenges to the current
response to migration, which are made all the more
intractable by the very different perceptions of risk held
by the various actors involved. First, it is clear that the
relationship with the smugglers is much more nuanced
than one of the exploiters and the exploited. They pro-
vide a service which is in great demand and, in many
cases, they deliver it—at least in as far as getting peo-
ple across to Yemen. Moreover, their operations, while
illegal are deeply embedded in the local political econo-
my, embracing the local authorities, business people and
the migrants themselves. While some may create a gate-
way that leads migrants into the arms of more violent
and ruthless traffickers, it is not clear that this is always
the case. Not all smugglers are equal. They may all be
breaking the law but in spaces of irregularity, where it
is almost impossible to move within the law, this does
not mean that they are necessarily a primary source of
harm to migrants (Gerver, 2019). At times, being under
the control of a smuggler may provide a form of protec-
tion. This was the case of Mona, an Ethiopian woman
who, finding herself stranded without money to pay for
the rest of her journey, was forwarded the money by a
charitable smuggler:
The smugglers in…asked me to pay an extra amount
of money which I did not have, and ordered me
to come out of the small transit centre together
with some other people whom we had travelled
with together. They asked me to come out and fol-
low them but I declined and they tried to pull me
out. But things seemed difficult till the other peo-
ple intervened and fundraised for me some of mon-
ey. The first smuggler whom I met in…helped me and
sent the remaining cash. (Mona, Ethiopian woman,
age 33, Bossaso)
These considerations raise important questions about
what the primary aim of interventions should be. Is it to
uphold national law? Or is it to uphold the basic human
rights of migrants?
Second, these findings on the different ways that
migrants assess risk must call into question campaigns
to provide information about the risks and dangers of
migration. The respondents knew there were risks and
many seemed quite matter-of-fact about them. The fam-
ilies are also very aware of the risks and struggle to
stop their children from leaving (Ali, 2016, pp. 42–43).
Moreover, the smugglers, by offering ‘travel now, pay lat-
er’ deals, have managed to use the danger as a means
to increase their custom among young Somalis looking
to reach Europe. Migrants’ determination to reach their
intended destination, even at significant financial and
physical cost, meant that awareness of the risks was no
deterrent to their movement. This suggests that until
young people in the Horn can see a future that enables
them to live up to the wider social expectations of con-
tributing to the household and starting their own fam-
ilies, it is a challenge to see how they can be deterred
from moving elsewhere. This discussion is often framed
as one of European states attempting to impose con-
trol on African states (Oette & Babiker, 2017). We also
need to look more closely at the disparity of interests
and analysis of risk between generations, where parents
and older generations dominate political, economic and
social structures.
8. Concluding Remarks
There is no doubt that the phenomenon of people
embarking on incredibly dangerous journeys in order
to move between countries is a huge problem. What
is so striking about the risks today is how unnecessary
they appear. People have embarked on perilous voyages
throughout history, but for the most part the dangers
were unknown, unpredictable and unavoidable. There
was no safe way to travel from Portugal to the Americas
in the 19th century, for instance. However, the work of
pioneers at many different levels has helped to reduce
the risk faced by future travellers—creating routes, iden-
tifying brokers and establishing networks of support ser-
vices ranging from transport to accommodation. Now it
is perfectly physically feasible to move with relative safe-
ty to almost any part of the world, if you have themoney
and it is politically feasible to do so. You have to have the
right papers to allow you to travel and for many this is
the main stumbling block.
We nowhave a growing array of stakeholders with an
interest in selectively controlling or reducing migration—
especially from poor parts of the world. Others have not-
ed the vicious cycle of increasing border controls and bar-
riers to entry resulting in pushing people into the hands
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of ever more dangerous smuggling groups, creating
a migration industry (Gammeltoft-Hansen & Sørensen,
2013; Schapendonk, 2018). Today, the successful migra-
tion of pioneersmakes things harder for thosewho come
after them, as routes are shut down, agents apprehend-
ed and costs soar. In this game, there is the implicit—or
sometimes explicit—calculation that if the costs and risks
are made high enough, it will deter people.
However, what this research suggests is that in this
calculation there is too much focus on the journey,
instead of thinking about the underlying project and its
significance. This study points to some more fundamen-
tal questions and theoretical debates that need to be
taken up. If we want to better understand the role of
risk in shaping mobility, we first have to ask what is at
risk. As noted above, the existing literature focuses on
two main areas: the extreme hazards of the journey and
the danger of failing to settle successfully at the destina-
tion. Another aspect of risk is that of staying behind. This
is often raised in reference to forced migration, where
people are subject to threats of death, multiple forms
of abuse and other gross violations of their fundamen-
tal rights. There is also the structural violence that is evi-
dent in the gross inequality, economic and political exclu-
sion that prevents people’s flourishing. There is some evi-
dence of both these risks driving young Ethiopians and
Somalis to embark on the perilous journey to Yemen.
However, for some of the young people interviewed,
migration appears to be a fundamental part of their indi-
vidual life project. Their primary aim is not to secure their
livelihood, or establish themselves abroad, but to live
out their lives as fully human. This echoes the findings
of Belloni, who analysed decision making for Eritreans
migrating to Europe in terms of gambling—they take a
bet with very low probability of success, but an extreme-
ly high benefit if they are successful (Belloni, 2016).
She argues that this ‘migration bet’ is concerned with
finding the conditions to make the transition to adult-
hood, where one can support the family, marry and have
children. Similarly, inWest Africa, Dougnon and Gagliardi
(2013) found that, for young men in Mali, migration
has a deeper cultural significance that defies econom-
ic rationality.
For some migrants, the hardships of the journey and
the possibility of failing are risks worth taking to obvi-
ate the much greater personal risk of being unable to
live a full life by not moving. For Ethiopians, this made
the risk of moving into the war zone of Yemen worth tak-
ing. A more complicated story seems to be emerging for
young Somalis engaging on this new convoluted route to
Europe. The individuals take the risk to their lives, but
they also put at risk the well-being of their families, who
not only end up paying their ransom but are also sucked
into the trauma of responding to the disappearance of
their children. How this plays out in family relationships
requires much more research. Ali (2016) has explored
this in more detail for the case of young people leav-
ing Somaliland heading north to Europe via Libya. Her
work highlights the gap in perception between the gener-
ations. Parents who have sufficient resources are invest-
ing significant sums to set up their children in businesses
to keep them from leaving, often to no avail. However,
the ‘travel now and pay later’ offer from the smugglers
enables young people to leave with no immediate cost.
They are aware that payment will have to be made, but
that future risk is discounted in their minds, so the dire
consequences for their families are played down at the
point of decision.
Therefore, we not only need to askwhat is at risk, but
also fromwhose perspective. It is clear thatmigrants and
their families may have very divergent views. However,
unlike Kalir’s (2005) ‘new type of migrant’ that moved
independently of the family, here we have migrants
being utterly dependent on the family, but the family
having very limited say in the decisions and yet facing
a huge cost. This raises the question of who bears the
risk. Perhaps this is one of the skills of the smugglers and
traffickers; not only to move people but also to move
some elements of risk away from those who are taking
decisions. For the agents deciding to operate in the irreg-
ular space of Yemen, they have reduced their own risk
of arrest and capture, potentially by putting migrants in
greater danger of physical harm from the conflicts. Their
‘travel now, pay later’ offer enables young Somalis to
push the risk into the future and divert it towards their
wider families.
While we acknowledge that this is a limited study
and these can be seen as extreme cases, they do high-
light the polyvalent character of risk in migration. It is
ascribed to multiple objects (the journey, the arrival, the
life-project), by different actors (the migrants, their par-
ents, smugglers, policymakers) and brings potential costs
to the same or other actors. This means it (in its many
forms) will act in complex ways to shape migration deci-
sions and outcomes. Here we have shown how extreme
risk can facilitatemigration.Withoutmaking any claim of
generalisability, this does challenge much of the analy-
sis that underpins many current theories of migration
and policies designed to respond to it. We hope that our
ongoing work and that of others will helps to refine our
analysis and start filling this critical lacuna.
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